(task) Homeland Security Today: DHS Ill-prepared for Pandemic Response, Inspector General Says

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Homeland Security Today: DHS Ill-prepared for Pandemic Response, Inspector General Says

DHS Ill-prepared for Pandemic Response, Inspector General Says
By: Anthony Kimery, Editor-in-Chief

09/09/2014 ( 6:31am)

An audit by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Inspector General (IG) of the department’s pandemic preparedness efforts to determine if DHS effectively manages its pandemic preparedness supply of personal protective equipment and antiviral medical countermeasures found that, “DHS did not adequately conduct a needs assessment prior to purchasing pandemic preparedness supplies and then did not effectively manage its stockpile of pandemic personal protective equipment and antiviral medical countermeasures.”

“Specifically,” the IG reported, DHS “did not have clear and documented methodologies to determine the types and quantities of personal protective equipment and antiviral medical countermeasures it purchased for workforce protection.”

The IG’s audit report, DHS Has Not Effectively Manage Pandemic Personal Protective Equipment and Antiviral Medical Countermeasures, said DHS “also did not develop and implement stockpile replenishment plans, sufficient inventory controls to monitor stockpiles, adequate contract oversight processes or ensure compliance with department guidelines.”

Consequently, the IG’s audit found, DHS “has no assurance it has sufficient personal protective equipment and antiviral medical countermeasures for a pandemic response. In addition, we identified concerns related to the oversight of antibiotic medical countermeasures.”

Nor does DHS have “assurance that the supplies on hand remain effective.”

In the event of any emergency, federal employees will be expected to continue operations to sustain agency functions. But an “influenza pandemic is not a singular event [and] may come in waves that last weeks or months,” the IG noted, adding, “It may also pass through communities of all sizes across the nation and world simultaneously, as demonstrated with the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic. The mounting risk of a worldwide influenza pandemic poses numerous potentially devastating consequences for critical infrastructure in the United States.”

DHS is responsible for ensuring it is adequately prepared to continue critical operations in the event of a pandemic. If it isn’t, DHS -- including the Federal Emergency Management Agency -- will be hard-pressed to protect its critical emergency response, infrastructure, intelligence and counterterrorism personnel, which would contribute to the massive societal breakdown authorities have warned will rapidly breakdown in the event of a highly virulent and transmissible influenza virus pandemic.

The Office of Health Affairs (OHA) is DHS’ principal authority for all medical and public health issues, providing medical, public health and scientific expertise in support of DHS’s mission to prepare for, respond to and recover from all threats. OHA also directs DHS’s workforce health protection and medical oversight activities, and provides medical and scientific expertise to support its preparedness and response effort.

DHS’s Directorate for Management is responsible for implementing the departmental occupational safety and health program, as well as procurement, property, equipment and human capital department-wide. Within the directorate, the Departmental Occupational Safety and Health office integrates safety and health principles into the management of DHS operations, and provides direction and advice to DHS management for occupational safety and health matters.

In 2006, Congress appropriated $47 million in supplemental funding to DHS to plan, train and prepare for a potential pandemic. But the IG audit “determined DHS cannot ensure it has sufficient personal protective equipment and antiviral medical countermeasures for a pandemic response.”

For example, IG auditors found that:

DHS has a reported inventory of approximately 16 million surgical masks without demonstrating a need for that quantity;
Personal protective equipment stockpiles include expired hand sanitizer. Out of the 4,982 bottles examined by IG auditors, 4,184 (84 percent) were expired, some by up to 4 years;
81 percent of antiviral drugs – especially Tamiflu and Relenza -- acquired by DHS’s Office of Health Affairs will expire by the end of 2015; and
DHS and its components do not know where its personal protective equipment is located, how much it has and the usability of the stockpiles that exist.
DHS’s IG audit reported stated that, “In Fiscal Year 2009, OHA purchased approximately 240,000 courses of the antivirals Tamiflu and Relenza on behalf of the department “without first determining the department’s pandemic needs. After its initial purchases, OHA prepared an acquisition management plan for antiviral Medical Countermeasures [MCM] which estimated its requirements.”

“However, OHA did not follow this plan,” the IG found. “Instead, OHA acted on a senior level decision establishing 110 percent coverage of the DHS workforce. The department has not provided any documentation demonstrating how the current stockpile of approximately 300,000 courses aligns with its pandemic needs. Since FY 2009, OHA has purchased additional antiviral MCM without reevaluating the stockpile quantity for reasonableness. OHA conducted periodic data calls to components to identify mission critical employees. However, OHA did not document how the information was used to ensure its stockpile of antiviral MCM would be sufficient to meet its needs.”

Continuing, the IG reported that, “Without sufficiently determining its needs, the department has no assurance it will have an adequate amount of antiviral MCM to maintain critical operations during a pandemic. Also, it cannot ensure previous and future purchases of antiviral MCM are an efficient use of resources.”

According to the IG, DHS acquired most of its stockpile of antiviral MCM in FY 2009, but did not implement an acquisition management plan that included a strategy for replenishment.

“Having an acquisition management plan would ensure its stockpile continued to meet its needs,” the IG said. “As a result, about 81 percent of its stockpile will expire by the end of 2015.”

DHS did recently spent more than $700,000 to purchase an addition 37,000 antiviral courses, but didn’t demonstrated how that purchase met its needs.

“OHA is applying for a shelf life extension with the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to extend the expiration dates on the antiviral MCM expiring in 2015, specifically Tamiflu, in the DHS stockpile,” the IG said. “We applaud their effort and encourage this process, as it reduces the resources needed to replace expiring drugs and would extend their Tamiflu stockpile expiration until 2018. However, OHA has not yet been granted an extension. Even with the extension, this may not fulfill the DHS requirements if a pandemic event occurs.”

In the event of a virulent influenza pandemic, Tamiflu and Relenza -- while not cures -- can reduce the severity and length of symptoms, allowing victims a better chance of full recovery.

“DHS is responsible for ensuring it is adequately prepared to continue critical operations in the event of a pandemic,” said Inspector General John Roth. “I am pleased that department officials have concurred with the intent of the 11 recommendations made in the report. We will work with them to see that this vital program is strengthened.”